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Abstract: This study focuses on the social structural approach of the reforms in Central and
Eastern European countries based on the material of an international conference held in Kiev.
In the fist part, we outline the role of elites, classes and civil society both during the system
change and after that. Supporting David Lane’s approach we define the terms of
administrative, capital and global political classes. In the second part, we examine the
developments during the recent twenty years in Ukraine since its independence. This period
has a double character: we see West-European democratic ideas and institutes implemented in
traditional Soviet mentality and practice. We analyze the successful initiatives of the country
striving for independency and the double characteristic institute system built on the
above-mentioned dichotomy. We lay special attention to the orange revolution, considered as
the most important reform by public opinion, in reality being only a swing towards building
democracy. In the third part, we leave the macro-social analytical frames behind and describe
the Parliament of Ukraine from inside. Our first impression of an ambiguously complex party
system becomes transparent as a result of applying the social network analysis. Based on
examining the structure of the legislative body, we discover the development of relationships
and dynamics among the political parties, groups and fractions during the four (!) significant
structural reforms in the concerned period.
Keywords: Post-communist countries, regime change, stratification, class, elite, double
institutional system, Orange Revolution, Parliament of Ukraine, social network analysies
On 18th and 19th of May 2006 the Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian
Academy hosted a conference on examining the societies’ transitions in Central and
Eastern Europe. The conference, initiated by David Lane (University of Cambridge)
titled: The role of the classes, the elite and the community in the transition of the
Ukrainian society 1 was organised with the aim of providing a professional forum to
the Ukrainian, Russian and foreign researchers to make comparison in space and time.
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1 The original title of the conference: Rol’ klassov, yelit, obschestvennosti v social’nyh transformaciyah v
Ukraine.
Documentation of the conference was published in a special issue of the Ukrainian
periodical called Sociology. The three separate sections of the conference were the
Classes, the Elites and the Community. In his keynote speech David Lane underlined
the general role of the elites, the classes and civil society in the transition of the Central
and Eastern European region. In the second comprehensive plenary lecture Ukrainian
co-authors (Golovakha and Panina) provided thorough analysis of the social
procedures of 20 years of the Ukrainian transition from many aspects.
In my interpretation these two studies are the pivots of the conference as the article
of Lane deepens our knowledge on societies under political system transition in
general, while the work of Panina and Golovakha provides detailed information on the
specific aspects of the transition of Ukraine on the one hand and the common features
of other Central and Eastern European societies on the other. Further to these two
studies there is a third one analyzing the social network of the Ukrainian Parliament
that is worth noticing. In this study, the authors Gorbachik and Zhulkevskaya focus on
the structure of the relationships of the members of parliament (MPs) as well as on the
changes there between 2002 and 2006.
CLASS ON THIS SIDE – GROUP ON THE OTHER? ELITES, CLASSES
AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE POST-SOCIALIST STATES
The name of David Lane sounds familiar to structure researchers. For instance, his
book published together with Cameron Ross in 1999 gives detailed information on
Soviet and post-soviet elites, their functions in starting the political transition and their
role in controlling independent Russia. In their important work Lane and Ross
primarily examine the career of the elites through different documents and interviews.
Focusing on the biggest successor state they emphasize that during the political
transition the so-called administrative or executive capital played a more important
role than the political one. This book pays special attention to analyzing the different
segments of the political elites such as the government bureaucracy, the members of
the Central Committee or the initially converging, later diverging Supreme Council.
At the beginning of his lecture at the conference Lane (2006), anticipating the most
important thoughts, mentioned that the main explanatory variables of the socialist
transition are generally depicted by the reproduction and the circulation of the elites.
Regarding the capitalist class during state socialism only a weak version of that could
be built up because of the undeveloped civil society. Lane holds the view that this latter
one could not develop because of the barely existing (professional) civil class. The
group of the society that advanced the move toward the market and privatization
during the Soviet era was the political elite who were “playing” both on the national
and the international “stage”. In the post-Soviet era the social disparity and the tension
within the society increased while the fast economic and political transition weakened
the improvement of the consciousness of the opposite class.
Before presenting his views Lane provided an overview of the social transition
theories considered to be relevant by him. Among others he touched upon the
Kullberg–Higley–Pakulski elite theory which explains the transition from state
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socialism to capitalism as the agreement of the elites. The author, continuing the
conception of Highley and Pakulski (1995), describes that the members of the elite
developed a strong formal ideological consensus while they had real disagreements
regarding specific political issues.
At this point Lane gets to that crucial question of why do the political elites who
carry out the post-communist reforms accept unanimously the ideology and logic of
the market, private ownership and multiparty system? In his opinion the class base
approach and principally not the elite paradigm (e.g. Higley) can give an appropriate
answer. The remaining part of the study focuses on this explanation. As a criticism the
researcher underlines that when it came to the inspection of the social changes the class
as explanatory variable practically vanished at the end of the 20th century, therefore
the expression is not present in the researches carried out on transition.
When the author determines the interests of the classes he specifies the meaning of
the expressions like: social, administrative, acquisition and global political class.
Social class is defined as a group of individuals with different life chances in terms of
market and ownership conditions. Administrative class on the one side consists of the
leaders of productive institutions (economic ministries, international commissions, big
companies) and organizations providing replacement (institutions of higher education,
scientific centres) on the other. Initially this class – similarly to the Chinese model –
supported such a transition in which the co-ordination of the economy would have
been controlled by the state machinery and the communist party. Latent extremist
members of the administrative class urged to weaken the central controlling-planning
as well as the Soviet state itself. Most of the Central European countries, including
Poland, shared the same view. Knowing these the question of Lane is well-founded: in
case this group was latent who did actually initiate the radical reforms?
To answer this question Lane invokes the citizenship of Mandel that the researcher
calls acquisition class2. Its members have two features: qualification and professional
skills. The acquisition class furthers the bourgeois redistribution of the resources,
namely increases their property which also supports the transition to the market
economy. They strongly maintained the civil society, a critical platform and
re-privatization of the political institutions. Gorbachev himself advocated this policy
in the first years of the reforms. In the early stage of the political transition
administrative and acquisition classes supported shoulder to shoulder the market;
however, they were not for the privatization of state property. In 1990 70% of the state
officials and the party leaders in the Supreme Council and more than 80% of the MPs,
former leaders and the professional intellectuals supported the market. However, when
it came to the questions of privatization and private ownership, 70% of the political
elite and 40% of the professional intellectuals voted against these issues.
Drawing the foreign capital into the analysis the author starts to introduce the term
global political class. As it is well known, in the socialist countries the role of the
transnational companies was quite low; by the middle of the eighties we hardly find
any relevant foreign investment. As he writes: “The capitalist companies formed a
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2 Namely: “ ... position composed of people seeking a system based on private property and markets. This
group we define as an ‘acquisition class’ … .” (Lane and Ross 1999: 19). In Russian translation:
priobretayuchiy klass. This practically covers the middle class or citizens.
unique island in the ocean of central planning.” (Lane 2006: 22)3 In the Soviet Union
foreign companies like Pepsi Cola or Fiat could operate under strong state control, the
number of the companies owned by foreigner owners was limited. Liberalization of the
economy was carried out when Gorbachev was the secretary of the party, though this
liberalization was not too efficient, under different rules the establishment of
companies with domestic foreign ownership was allowed, economic zones were made.
Lane supports the difficult implementation by the following data: in 1989 only 23
foreign–domestic joint ownership companies existed in the Soviet Union. Due to the
economic policy of the perestroika this number was 1572 in 1990, however, in spite of
the considerable nominal increase the volume of the investments was not high, the
only considerable investor was Fiat by investing 1 billion dollars.
In addition to the economic sphere, by involving the social segment Lane
underlines: “Societies of the state socialism were considered to be half-periphery in
the capitalist states.” (Lane 2006: 22). The transnational capitalist class was unable to
exist as it really is, there were no latent representatives of international capital in the
socialist countries, and therefore the new reigning capitalist class could not develop.
However, the relationship of the domestic political and economic elite with each other
on the one hand and their relationship with the international elite on the other were
such external impulses that induced the change of the social system. After that the
researcher shows the response given by the state to these challenges.
Lane differentiates between the two functions of the state. The first one was within
the scope of the national economy where the state is an instrument of the capitalist
class hegemony; the second one is toward the world where the state protects the
interests of national capital. Which of them comes into the limelight is determined by
fact that the state would like to enforce its national or international interest. Here we
come to a crucial point of the study where the author underlines that transition to the
market economy and the commencement of privatization was initiated, supported by
the international political elites.4 In his opinion the promoter of the changes was not the
global capitalist class, but the alliance between the political elites, but that alliance was
quite difficult to reveal. There was an internal agreement between Gorbachev and
Shevarnadze and also the representatives of the external political elite – George Bush,
Helmut Kohl, Bill Clinton, Margaret Thatcher, allied with each other too. In the
interpretation of Lane the global political elite (not class!) that plays an important role
is the group of people who make the global political–economic strategy. They are the
international state and non-state organizations (CIA, IMF), globalization–oriented
politicians and leaders5.
In the following part of his study Lane names the international political elite
institutions that initiated the capitalist transition and managed the domestic economic
and social policy changes. These institutions were the IMF, the European Union and
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3 We may not handle the socialist countries as a uniform block. In order to sophisticate the view Lane
mentions a Hungarian example where foreign capital already entered the country at the beginning of the
seventies, similarly to Poland
4 At this point Lane reminds us not to mix up the global political elites which launched the changes with
the global capitalist class.
5 As an example there appears a footnote on the participants of the Davos Conference.
the Council of Europe. Their aim was to introduce a multiparty political system and
neo-conservative economic policy primarily in those post-socialist countries that
wanted to accede to the EU. As a result in June 1993 the Copenhagen criteria
expressing the interest of the global capitalist class were agreed upon.
The last part of the study is about the support of the transition by the societies. To
enter into detail the author first mentions civil society that consists of two spheres. On
the first, economic level there are such business associations that are established by
private owners in order to make profit. As a social class there is the bourgeoisie behind
it. By Lane the second class consists of the social and political organizations such as
civil organizations, parties. This is the platform where criticism and protest against the
state can be expressed. Lane underlines that not unknown fact that civil society in the
post-socialist countries is weak regarding both of these features. Since no bourgeoisie
existed during state socialism, they were unable to organize themselves into a specific
class. Regarding Russia and Ukraine he underlined: capitalism has not developed in
these countries, for the time being the development is still “guarded” by the state6.
After the socialist era, it was not really successful to form the top controlled civil
society that was supported by the West. Taking specific data, Lane demonstrates that
with the exception of the trade unions, the number of all civil organizations’ members
remained quite low. Members of the organizations related to human rights and the
problems of the third world are just a low percentage of the average of the Western
countries, and lags behind the average of the new EU countries.7
When it comes to transition we speak about winners and losers – reminds the
author. The new acquisition class gained considerable advantage, while the blue-collar
workers and peasants lost so much. The intelligentsia cannot be squarely put under
either of the categories. Approach to the reforms is a question of class and time.
Members of the administrative class make profit on it, while the role of those
belonging to the acquisition class as well as the intelligentsia is dual. Those who were
against the reforms in the post-communist countries belong to lower classes, the old
and the ones with lower levels of education. In the countries that changed their political
system such self-organizing activities that concern the whole country are rare, there is
no permanent and wide social base of these initiatives. Having made a comparison
Lane mentions that while in the Western countries the key for stability is the strong
civil society, the post-socialist countries can be described by such stability that is result
of the agreement of the elites.
Summarizing the lecture the following can be stated. The Central and Eastern
European transitions can rather be called transformation than revolution, since there
were no essential specifications like violence, charismatic leaders, ideological basis
and the power of the propertied involved. The best supporters of capitalist transition
are the holders and the administrative class. The activity of both groups was
determined by the political culture of state socialism, they were unable to
communicate their ideology clearly. Capitalism was created centrally, from the top,
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6 The determining and revolving role of the state is reinforced by the re-nationalization of the major
Russian oil companies.
7 Here Lane made reference to the findings of the European Values Study of 1999–2000 and the 2004
European Social Survey.
transnational companies took part in developing the capitalist ideology, institutions
and procedures. Lane shows the strengths and weaknesses of the political transition.
As a weak point he mentions that the “immaturity” of the civil society revived the pact
of the political elites. In the new EU Member States the capitalist class could become
stronger since in these societies “the capitalist class took root prior to the Soviet era”
(Lane 2006: 30). On the contrary, state socialism in the Soviet Union – with the
exception of the Baltic States – was stronger; it had a domestic revolution base and a
less homogeneous elite. Therefore the reach of the so-called elite pact was more
complicated. The strong reforms of Gorbachev required external, foreign economic
assistance. The weakness of the civil society generated the development of the
bourgeoisie; members thereof knew how to get capital while their political knowledge
was incomplete. Lane’s closing words underline that post-socialist transition can not
be considered to be over and further political system transition movements are
expected in the Eastern part of Europe.
While reading the study we can be convinced on the competence and researching
experience of David Lane. He makes reference to numerous theories and empirical
research findings – including his results – creating the impression that he can see this
field from above. He investigates the transition process of the Central and
East-European countries, putting the Soviet Union into the spotlight. In some cases
he emphasizes the characteristic of certain states (for instance, in case of Hungary
and Poland), but in most cases he speaks about the countries in general, without
making any differentiation among them. Sometimes it seems to be a bit too
generalized. The way he applies the expressions shows that the author considers
these countries uniformly as he uses the expression of post-communist countries,
sometimes replacing it by the post-socialist adjective. But we are used to the fact the
post-communist label is used – especially by foreign authors – to all of the Central
and East-European countries, for the sake of order we must note that this attribute
cannot be used regarding the Central European or Baltic States. Nevertheless, on the
whole this is a quite nice, diversified, balanced style of study that represents the
author’s own views.
THE CENTAUR STATE. UKRAINE FROM PERESTROIKA TO THE
ORANGE REVOLUTION
Golovakha and Panina (2006) estimate the length of the social transition to last for
about 20 years from the nomenclature of Gorbachev to the Orange Revolution. From
this era there are plenty of data regarding the changes that happened concerning the
Ukrainian society.8 This article summarizes concisely the findings of these researches.
The authors display the actual status of the society in chronological order, starting with
perestroika and the political change of 1991: the period when the nation became
independent. The researchers picked up three components of the stable institutional
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8 They carried out several data recording in relation to several foreign projects. The co-operating countries
are the following: Hungary (Simon J., Bruszt L.), USA: 1991–1992, Switzerland: 1992–1994, USA:
1993–1996, France: 1994–1997, USA: 1996–2005, Russia: 1998–2006, Poland: 2001–2004.
system of this time: the lawmakers’ base that ensures the social institutions, the
institutional infrastructure that enmeshes everything and the fact that most of the
inhabitants accept the so-called Soviet lifestyle. Golovakha and Panina underlined that
the former Soviet Union was not ready for transition at all, and its signs can be seen in
all of the successor countries, with the exception of the Baltic States. For instance, the
GDP of these countries which became independent does not reach the level of the
former Soviet Union, the political leaders are authoritarian and this is accepted by the
society.
They raised the question of what was the motive of the significant social changes.
In their response they indicated two main factors, however, these causes were not the
regular reasons (international economic interests, war in Afghanistan, strive for
national independence): Gorbachev came into power and there was the Chernobyl
catastrophe. The appearance of young leaders’ group was expected after the long
period of gerontocracy and this caused that the totalitarian ideology supporting the
state was questioned. While the nuclear explosion put such fatal danger into the
spotlight what irresponsible people controlling such technology may cause to the
society.
The collapse of the institutions was supported by three further factors: pressure of
the West, endeavor for independence of the socialist-block countries, and the burdens
of subsidy granted to the anti-Western third world that put the pressure on the Soviet
economy. Going back to the findings of the researches carried out in the seventies they
remarked that the need for high social status resulted in dissatisfaction with the social
system among the young, dynamic workers entering the labor market. Because a huge
number of them wanted to be given such positions that would have placed them at a
higher level of the social hierarchy. Therefore the leaders of the Soviet Union should
let some social-economic freedom to the ambitious cohorts. From the other side the
authors believe that this way did not attract the talented intelligentsia, who played an
important role in the political transition according to David Lane as well.
The researchers continue with the unique role of Ukraine emphasizing that the
post-communist transition caused damage to practically all the social institutions,
demolishing such institutions that guaranteed the social order like legality and
organizational infrastructure. At the same time signs of the legal order appeared,
including presidential power, multiparty system, private ownership, and private
companies. The new legitimate institutional infrastructure appeared and paradoxically
it did not embody the norms of the democratic society. As they wrote “… Ukraine was
ready to demolish the old institutional system just as it was not prepared to build up the
new ones” (Golovakha and Panina 2006: 37).
The second part of the study is about the period 1992–1994. At a first sight one may
think that the institutional system necessary to launch the democratic market economy
in Ukraine was made by the beginning of 1992. Moreover, a unique Ukrainian model
was developed that is different from the Baltic, Russian, Caucasian and Central Asian
ones. Similarly to the Byelorussian and Kazakh structure this is a ’half-open’ or
’closed-open’ society where the economy is controlled by the state, but slowly it is
vested with signs of the market. It is easy to understand that this ’political-economic
centaur’ could not live for long time. In the first phase of the transition most of the
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population was under the poverty threshold and people were fighting for physical
survival. However, this model was sustainable as the different political forces did not
confront, there were no revolts, no carnages; therefore President Leonid Kravchuk
could regard his internal policy to be successful. The majority of the population
candidly supported the democratic institutional system and the market economy while
indeed they lived in accordance with the principles of the former political system.
We must touch the role of the diversified political elite at the beginning of the
transition. As a result thereof the political elite were split up as the party in power and
the opposition. Following the change of the political system there evolved a dispute on
the one hand between the former and the new elites as well as between the society and
the elite and these caused tension in the post-totalitarian society. The former leaders
preserved their economic power and the new elite hold the ideological power in their
hands as power was based on the independence of the nation state. The roughly dozen
parties declared themselves to be opposition parties but were unable to act as real
opposition parties, while the party in power easily sacrificed its ideology and its own
individual political character.
The third period of independent Ukraine was between 1994 and 1998, when a
double institutional system was developed. In the first years of independence
practically no new legitimate institutions were introduced in Ukraine, rather the former
leaders renewed themselves and acted without any financial, prestige or moral losses.
The political phenomenon called centaur means that on the level of intentions Ukraine
turns its head to the West while its body behaves in accordance with the spirit of
socialism. Here below the period of reaching national independence is compared with
the period of the double institutional system in a demonstrative manner:
The authors return to the question of what was the reason that the Ukrainian
society had avoided the ’second comeback of the communist messiah’? They
explained it with the following: the Soviet social institutions lost their legality but
kept their traditional legitimacy. As people accepted, for instance the state-owned
big companies also education, healthcare, science and arts continued to be managed
by the state. On the other hand the Soviet black market solutions, the double morals
and the corruption were filtered into the legitimate institutions of the new,
transitional society. Therefore wide segments of the society felt ambivalent
regarding the emerging old-new order. This is called by the authors as the ’hyper
full-value of institutions.’ The classic sample is the members of the Ukrainian
Parliament who were active at the same time in the economic and political life. These
social processes embedded in a worsening economic situation combined with
degreasing GDP, high unemployment rate, decreasing standard of living, pessimistic
mood of people, dissatisfaction with the present and uncertainty regarding the future.
However, in this manner the country progressed ahead at a snail’s pace. Since the
Constitution was enacted, wide range of privatization procedures was launched9 and
a new national currency was introduced.
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9 The process can really be considered to be successful, as by 1998 most of the companies were privatized
– as it is emphasized by Panina and his co-author.
Table 1. Ukraine during the Period of reaching the National Independence
and the Double Institutional System
Features10
1991–early 1992
National independence
1994–1998
Double institutional system
Economic orientation Economy is regulated bymarket mechanism
Producers’ sector is supported
by the state
Support by the society
Independence of the state is
supported by the majority of
society
Support of t reintegration
Role of the communist party Lost its social mass base The main opposition partywould like to get the power
Responsibility Communist party was blamedfor the crisis
The democratically elected
power is responsible
The next part of the study focuses on the period of 1999–2004, in which stage a
new institutional crisis developed and which was ended by the Orange Revolution.
The first presidential term of Leonid Kuchma that commenced in 1994, was featured
by political stability and economic difficulties, while the second one by economic
growth and political storms. In Golovakha’s and Panina’s opinion the anti-Kuchma
feeling of the society was stemming from the contradiction between the institutional
system and the expectations of the active segments of the society and the interest of the
political elite of the opposition. The first attack against Kuchma in 2001 failed as the
President was practically kept in his position by the double institutional system.
Further on, in spite of the slow advancement of economic indicators most people were
focusing on their own living, they did not have time and interest to take care of high
politics. The standard of living increased by 2004, and people – looking out from their
day-to-day problems – wanted to put an end to the Kuchma-era. By this time the effects
of the double system’s infrastructural and normative overload were felt by the people
that made the society feel desolate and dissatisfied with their social position. The
society found response to their emotions in the slogans of the opposition: “Bandits, to
the prison!” “Power shall be separated from business”.
After this the researchers continue concisely with the Orange Revolution. First
they underline that in accordance with a survey carried out shortly after the revolution
a strong democratization of the common knowledge took place. In other words, trust in
the president of the republic, the government, the multiparty system and the leaders
increased and respondents were convinced that the average people may have influence
on the political processes of the country; they depicted a positive future of the state. A
year later, just after the elections of April 2006, researches measured a lower level of
democratization; therefore in their opinion the feeling in 2005 was just an oscillation
toward democracy. Expectations of the revolution were cracked by reality.
In the last part of their study the authors examine the effect of the Orange
Revolution on the society in the light of the surveys carried out since. Golovakha and
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10 The study originally contained the right column of the chart the system of aspects would be own
supplement.
Panina focus on the striking change of mood within a year. While in 2005 the state of
mind of people could be described by optimism, hope, joy and satisfaction, a year later
the expressions are restlessness, fear, and pessimism. Moreover, opinion about the
state institutions and political leaders became worse, respect for the institution of the
president, executive power and the multiparty and representative systems decreased.
The authors believe that people were disappointed both with the president of the state
and the leaders of the revolution. The latter were supported by 15% of the respondents;
next they became alienated from these leaders. Falling of support of the revolutionary
powers is attributable to the fact that the leaders of the resolution, despite their
promises made earlier, were not able to clear, for instance the political life, did not act
against the economic abuses of the previous leadership (Ludvig 2007). Selective social
memory is shown by the finding that in the year of 2006 a further 10 per cent of those
questioned told – compared to the survey made a year ago –that they had never
supported the Orange Revolution. Within a year the number of those tripled who felt
themselves losers of the revolution.
Then authors create the impression that the public in Ukraine moved toward the
’Eastern geopolitical vector’, and the number of those against NATO accession
increased. It is somewhat controversial bit that at the same time people do support the
EU accession of Ukraine.11 Two fifths of the people seem to be committed toward
double directions: they consider acceptable to approach both the West and Russia. The
authors draw the attention to another contradiction: the geopolitical orientation is not
in accordance with the party preference of the respondents as well as the program of
the supported party. The change of the mood of the people in 2006 is attributable to the
dissatisfaction of the people: they were disappointed in the new power, after the
revolution they did not get everything and immediately what they had expected. This
disappointment does exist in the heart of the people despite the fact that their financial
situation became better most recently.12 On the other hand, the authors are not satisfied
with the explanation of disappointment; in their opinion the real reasons must be
deeper. From their point of view the Ukrainian society lives in a vacuum of values: the
old system of values is dissolved but the new democratic principles have not yet
developed. This norm and value basis that indicates what is good and what is bad, what
is to be punished and what is to be rewarded is missing. These circumstances brought
most members of the society into the phase of the ’loss of values without norms’.
Consequently the community tries to reorganize the social order based on traditional
values. This is felt by those who get power as they appreciate the archaic values or try
to make religion part of the state system of education.
Closing their article, Golovakha and Panina underline that the Orange Revolution
that calls itself a democratic revolution is at the same time a cultural-ethnic revolution.
They hold the view that historical identity is a very important aspect when it comes to
the survey of the post-revolutionary social system. This historical memory divides
Ukraine into numerous geographical parts: while the western part of the country would
like to get out of the influence of Russia and Eastern Ukraine feels a social-cultural
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11 In 2006 it was 61%, at the same time the Russian–Ukrainian–Belarus union was supported by 64% of
respondents.
12 As it was told by those questioned their salary, pension or bursary increased by 45%.
unity with Russia, the Centre tries to balance between the two. Central Ukraine is in the
stage of the double hesitation and rather prefers the West. The authors point out the
responsibility of the political elite: it is impossible to put a country on the basis of
democracy if even those leading the country violate the law. They believe that the
leaders of the country must see to it that the laws are consistently followed and they
shall persuade the society about it by their personal example.
The researchers started a major enterprise when they decided to summarize the
political-social events and their effects on Ukraine in the last 15–20 years. I think that
their undertaking was successful. The article provides lot of knowledge to the reader,
exciting both to the researchers and to the public. Besides the amusing language of the
article it has a negative effect: they use many picturesque and literary metaphors that
increase the level of the article, but, however make the paper more difficult to
understand and to get the scholarly findings. There are extremely long trains of
thoughts in the article, one may feel that very often they do not only communicate data
but use the game of the words in the text. This is quite amusing, but less informative.
From this point of view chapter four of the study is different: in this part the authors
focus rather on the bottom-line.
The level of the study is increased by the fact that the authors apply new, effective
expressions. Expressions like political-economic centaur institutions, centaur state,
second return of the communist messiah, hyper full-value of institutions.
Nevertheless, this is a realistic study containing lots of empirical data; the low
number of literature quoted can be mentioned as a problem. At the beginning of the
study the list of researches, findings used by them, is contained ’in bulk’ but the main
part of the study quite rarely makes reference to any domestic or foreign researchers
and researches. Reference by name is applied in the study only three times when
Lane, Inglehardt and Sereda are mentioned. The quotation of empirical data is
unbalanced in the study. In the first part of the article practically there are no research
findings; however, the second part contains plenty of percentage share data.
Compared to it the article of David Lane is much more balanced and the author was
not sparing with the references. Taking into consideration these critical remarks this
is a very important, high-toned, comprehensive study showing the Ukrainian society
from many aspects.
LOYALTY OR DISLOYALTY? DYNAMICS OF THE RELATIONSHIPS IN
THE PARLIAMENT OF UKRAINE
In the recent years we have been used to the fact that the Ukrainian political and
public life is loud with tough quarrels: privatization scandals, the parliament turned
against the president, government crisis, parliamentary elections earlier than
scheduled, difficulties of forming the new government. In addition to the actual
disputes – as it was already mentioned above – both the political elite and the public are
divided, the general feeling is marked by duality: to stay in the pull of Russia or to be
committed to the West. On the scene of high politics this dilemma seemed to be
outlined regarding the questions like the natural gas supply of Ukraine, the United
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Economic Area, WTO membership and NATO accession (Ludvig 2006). In the
Ukrainian party politics – summarizing the question in a nutshell – the two ’orange’
parties (President Viktor Yuschenko and the Our Ukraine and Yulia Tymoshenko’s
Block) would like to reinforce connections with the West, while they try to put Russia
into the shade; on the other hand Viktor Yanukovich, the former president, leader of
the Party of Regions, making use of his close Eastern connections would pursue a
pro-Russia politics. The only main question in which the three parties – Our Ukraine,
Party of Regions and Yulia Tymoshenko Block – agree is that all of them support
Ukraine’s EU accession; and this is also supported by the majority of the society
(Golovakha and Panina 2006). The country is divided as it is reflected by the behavior
of the voters. For instance, let us take the elections at the end of 2004, the voters of the
two politicians made an East–West and a Ukrainian–Russian imaginary language
divide within the country: while the Western regions – like Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk,
Vinnica, Zhitomir and the Russian-speaking centrally located Kyiv – voted for
Yuschenko, the regions of the east – Lugansk, Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov,
Krim – voted for Yanukovich.
In the spring of 2006 parliamentary elections were held in the country and
carried out in accordance with the law. However, some months later it turned out
that the president and the government cannot work together. The long lasting
political crisis was planned to be eliminated at by-elections scheduled to be on 30
September 2007. After 4 months of negotiations the new government was formed,
and the parties agreed upon the Prime Minister. However, co-operation of Our
Ukraine and Tymoshenko Block in the government lacked a stable foundation. The
permanent political uncertainty and the considerable amount spent by the
government on social purposes had a negative result, for instance in 2006 the
growth of the GDP dropped13. At the same time some positive changes took place
in the economy. Ukraine is one of the most dynamically developing countries of the
region, the interest of foreign investors has increased, inflation rate decreased,
unemployment rate went down and the fight against black economy has been
continuing successfully (Ludvig 2007).
As we know, the Ukrainian political groups and political parties are quite
diversified. For example, in 1998 49, in 2002 62, in 2006 45, while in the by-elections
in 2007 20 parties and blocks participated in the parliamentary elections. In accordance
with the amendment of the Constitution14 as from 2006 all 450 MPs are elected from
the list of the parties. The fact that prime ministers are changed in Ukraine quite often
underlines that political life is active and unstable: in the last 20 years there were 18
prime ministers. Three of them were in this position twice: Vitaly Masol, Viktor
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13 In order to be precise we should add the fact that different sources (OECD, WB, Ministry of Finance of
Ukraine) provide different data on the GDP. For instance, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Ukraine GDP growth was 7.1% in 2006, 10.8% in 2004 and 9.3% in 2003. As forecasted by the World
Bank the growth rate in 2008 is expected to be 5.5% whilst the recent economic crisis may modify this
forecast.
14 The Parliament of Ukraine, officially called Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy (Supreme Committee of
Ukraine) – enacted the Constitution on 26 June 1996, which was considerably amended on 8
December 2004. As a result of the amendment of 2006 a semi-presidential system was introduced in
Ukraine (Fedinec 2007).
Yanukovich and Yulia Tymoshenko15. Continuity is secured by the institution of the
president of the republic. For the longest period Leonid Kuchma was in this position:
he was president for 11 years between 1994 and 2005. All of the presidents were in
other state positions before the presidency: Leonid Kravchuk was the speaker parliament
for one and half years before he became the president in 1991, Leonid Kuchma was
prime minister for nearly a year in 1992–1993, while the current president, Viktor
Yuschenko was the prime minister for one and half years from 1999 on.
After this general introduction let us continue with those discussed in the section
called Elites of the conference. Gorbachik and Zhulkevskaya (2006) examine the
structure of the Verkhovna Rada and the changes thereof by applying the social
network analysis during the fourth term of Parliament between 2002 and 2006.16 They
grab the connection of the political and informal groups by examining the cases when
an MP crosses over from one political group to another, suggesting that when a
representative in the Parliament joins another political group it makes connection
between the political groups involved. The change of the political group can be done
directly (from A to B) or indirectly, when a person first gets into another political
group or informal group then joins the third one (from A to C, then from C to B). By
the authors, the connection between the two groups involved is stronger, the structural
units know each other better, and a bigger number of the transactions take place
between them.
As we have mentioned, Gorbachik and Zhulkevskaya’s survey covers the fourth
term, when Vladimir Litvin was the Speaker of the parliament. The vividness of the
fractions, parties and political groups referred above is proven by the data that there
were 37 political groups and parties – existing for shorter or longer term – in the
factions during the four-year term. By March 2006 the previous high number of parties
was normalized but there still remained 13 political groups and fractions17.
Considerable changes took place in the parliament: parties and political groups were
established and wound up, factions split up and were reorganized again. Further on, the
circulation of the members from one faction to another is practically continuous. There
were four major structural changes of the parliament during the period referred to; that,
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15 Masol was Prime Minister from 28 June 1990 to 17 October 1994, and from 16 June 1994 to 6 March
1995, Janukovich 21 November 2002 – 7 December 2004, and from 4 of August 2006 to 23 August 2006.
The name of Janukovich marks the few-day period between 28 December 2004 and 5 January 2005.
Timosenko, the current Prime Minister of Ukraine was elected on 18 December 2007, after the crisis of
the government he was prime minister before between 4 February and 8 September 2005. Nikolai
Azarov was prime minister twice as temporary solution in the period of 7–28 December 2004 and 5–24
January 2005.
16 The new era in the Ukrainian Parliament started on 30 March 1990, this is the date when the first
parliament of the independent Ukraine was elected. The first term started on 15 May 1990. The sixth
term of the Verkhovna Rada has been on since 30 September 2007.
17 Five of the 13 factions (the communists, the Our Ukraine of president Viktor Juschenko, the (United)
Social-democrat Party of Ukraine led by Yuri Zagorodnij, Yulia Tymoshenko Block, Ukrainian Socialist
Party led by Aleksandr Moroz were present from the beginning of the period, since 2002. Three of them
(National Party, Ukrainian National Party and the Party of the Ukrainian Entrepreneurs and Industrialists
led by Anatoly Kinah) were founded in 2005, while the five youngest started to work at the turn of the
years 2005–2006. After the election of 2006 four of the oldest factions got into the parliament again: the
communists, Our Ukraine, Yulia Tymoshenko Block and Ukrainian Socialist Party.
of course, did not leave the party structure as well as the members of the specific
parties unchanged.18
For following the changes of the number of the political groups and factions the
researchers introduced an index deviating between –1 and +1, the negative values refer
to the decrease of the number of the group, while the positive values refer to the
increase of the group’s size. Taking the end of the fourth term of the parliament and 13
factions the authors found that the number of the members of six groups increased, six
decreased while the number of members of the Party of Reforms and Order did not
change. The balance was positive for the Yulia Tymoshenko Block, the socialists, the
Litvin Block, the Regions of Ukraine faction and two other parties considering
themselves to be national. On the other hand, the Our Ukraine or the faction of
social-democrats suffered losses. The motives of changes are explained in two
different ways by the experts. Leaving a political group on the one hand may refer to
the weak ideological identity and commitment of the MP, and this may be a signal of a
proper adaptation strategy on the other.
Continuing the empirical analysis the authors underline that the communist, the
socialist and the social-democratic factions possess the most developed structural
autonomy, which means that they were the least concerned by such changes. In order to
outline the position of the parties in the network of the parliament the authors introduce
the expression ‘centrality’ which carries three different meanings. First, it refers to the
direct and indirect connections with other political groups, second, its position as a hub
in the network and third, it means also its mediator role. In other words, the first aspect is
transit between the groups (structural units) which means the change of place of the
members. The second aspect – in addition to those specified in the previous sentence –
shows the role of the ’acquaintance of the acquaintance’ during the change. The third
element refers to the transmitting function regarding the whole parliament.
If we take the second half of the period the year of 2005, the Yulia Tymoshenko
Block was one of those in the central position. This central position was supported by the
number of direct and indirect connections with other parties as well as the rate of the
transmitting function. The authors agree that their key position is attributable to the
common knowledge that Yulia Tymoshenko is to be named as candidate to the prime
ministry. With the exception of the transmitting function the same can be noticed in case
of the Party of the Regions. The faction of Our Ukraine has slightly lower indices of
centrality compared to the two organizations referred to above. The authors – following
the findings of Granovetter and Burt – disclosed the structural holes in the ego network,
types thereof are the following: effectiveness of the relationships, limits, and hierarchy.
As the scholars found the following parties have the most effective relationships: Our
Ukraine, Communist Party, the Yulia Tymoshenko Block, the (United)
Social-democratic Party and the Litvin National Block. The second indicator shows
those limits that are formed by the small-figure relationship around the ego. By the
findings of the research the most individual unit is the Our Ukraine, while the Yulia
Tymoshenko Block showed a slight independence. The phenomenon called hierarchy is
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18 They happened in: May–July 2002, August–September 2002, October 2004–August 2005 and
September 2005–March 2006.
the case when the effectiveness of the network of a person is limited by another specific
person. If the ego network has lots of relationships, that is a limitation to the ego then one
may predict the lowest level of the hierarchy. In case there is such a strong relationship
that practically blocks the operation of the individual network then the level of hierarchy
approaches the highest level. According to the findings the networks of the socialists and
the communists concentrate the least on one single faction; they are relatively ’free’. As
we have seen it earlier these two parties have a high level of structural independence. The
authors search those people who act like bridges between the different groups helping
the integrity of the whole network by such activity. Among the known key players the
following parties functioned as bridges: in the second term of the period For United
Ukraine and Our Ukraine, in the third one the People’s Party, in the fourth the Yulia
Tymoshenko Block and the Block of the Regions of Ukraine.
The researchers underline the following general tendencies in the Ukrainian
Parliament during the term of 2002–2006. First of all: the more considerable factions made
up by different political forces are willing to split up by the features of the different parties.
This was also the tendency regarding the split For United Ukraine as well as the previously
opposition government party Our Ukraine. Second they found that the factions with clear
ideology are less likely to be ’involved’ in parliamentary relations, the number of the
members in these factions is relatively consistent, in other words the number of change of
the members is low. This result is confirmed by the fact that only one of the political
groups formed based on common interest – and not on a common ideological base –
continued to work after the election of 2006: this was the Litvin National Block. Further on
it was also found that the direct or indirect connection with these political groups may
serve as a resource to the particular party: it increases the lobby possibilities of the given
group. The Yulia Tymoshenko Block is a good example of this: with the help of its
network resources it gained quite strong parliamentary support in the course of electing
Yulia Tymoshenko as prime minister in February 2005.19 Finally, they state that the power
of a parliamentary political group is measurable not only by the number of its relationships
with other political groups, but also by the possibility of autonomous initiatives and acting
as well as how they can avoid the networking control of the organization.
The article of Gorbachik and his co-author made the possibility to get an inside view
into the life of the Ukrainian Parliament. This article is interesting both to the public and
to the scholars. The authors successfully simplify that disturbingly vivid overview one
may have on Verkhovna Rada at a first glance. All of this is made by them through
applying the social network analysis. The term of 2002–2006 was very active in the
Ukrainian Parliament: there were a total of 37 political groups, parties and factions in
four years, the authors intended to follow and outline the structural changes, and they
pointed out four important structural changes during this period. After making the
balance of those representatives who changed from one faction to another in the
parliament they emphasise that the socialists, the communists and the social democrats
changed parties most rarely: they have the highest level of structural autonomy. The
hands of the socialists and the communists are free, they are not bound by any strong
relation; therefore they are relatively free to act. They pointed out that by the years of
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19 On 4 February 2005 Tymoshenko was elected prime minister by a record number of votes, 343 voted for her.
2005–2006 the Yulia Tymoshenko Block and the Party of the Regions of Ukraine
moved toward a central position from their non-central one at the beginning of the term.
The researchers have proper knowledge in using the method of social network analysis
as well as its terms and techniques. Methodologically it is a nice solution, that the
relationship between two political groups is operationalised as accessibility from one
political group to another. They explain and use their definitions – as centrality or
structural anatomy – accurately in an easy-to-follow manner.
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